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Abstract
We present a dynamic model that produces day-to-day changes in key variables due
to the COVID-19 contagion: currently infected people, accumulated infected people, re-
covered people, deaths, and infected people who require hospitalization. The model is
calibrated to the COVID-19 outbreak in Spain so that it replicates the death toll and the
phases on the daily deaths curve. Then, we study the effects of the isolation enforcement
following the declaration of the State of Alarm (March 14th, 2020). The simulations in-
dicate that both the timing and the intensity of the isolation enforcement are crucial for
the COVID-19 spread. Since the infection curve was already very steep at the time of the
State of Alarm declaration, a 4-day earlier intervention for social distancing would have
reduced the number of COVID-19 infected people by 67%. The model also informs that
the isolation enforcement does not delay the peak day of the epidemic but slows down its
end. Finally, we find that when social distancing relaxes the evolution of the COVID-19
in Spain will be very sensitive to both the contagion probability (which it is expected to
go down due to preventive actions) and the number of interpersonal encounters (which
it is expected to go up due to the reopening of economic and social activities). We report
a threshold level for the contagion pace to avoid a second COVID-19 outbreak in Spain.
Key words: COVID-19 pandemic, calibrated model simulations, isolation enforcement,
policy intervention design
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1 Introduction
On March 11th 2020, the World Health Organization declared the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) outbreak a pandemic—a worldwide spread of the disease. As of May 2nd, there
are 238,431 confirmed deaths due to COVID-19 worldwide, with the US, Italy, UK, Spain, and
France being the worst hit countries, and the total number of confirmed cases has reached
3.31 million.
Unfortunately, the pandemic is still in progress unleashing a global health crisis and
putting enormous pressure on health care systems. The travel related source of virus spread
was quickly followed by ‘community spread’ where the initial source of the infection remains
unidentified. Governments and public authorities have implemented mandatory actions to
contain the virus spread such as travel restrictions, lockdowns, closures of public spaces,
institutions, and businesses, social (and physical) distancing, and self-isolation.
Drawing on the epidemiological Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) methodology, pi-
oneered by Kermack and McKendrick (1927), we present a discrete-time dynamic model to
predict the COVID-19 contagion. Even though the model is simple, it captures the main char-
acteristics of the contagion process and provides insights valuable for policy orientation. We
calibrate the model parameters to aggregate Spanish data and present simulations to show
the dramatic implications of enforcing mobility constraints over the COVID-19 spread in
Spain.1 We also present three short-term scenarios that may occur when these constraints are
eased.
2 Model description
For any given day t, we have the decomposition
N = xt + zt
1Our paper can be connected to several recent contributions. Prem et al. (2020) conduct a similar exercise to
ours for the city of Wuhan in China with some differences in both the calibration and the model predictions.
Sebastiani et al. (2020) analyze the role of government measures in slowing and reducing COVID-19 growth in
different regions in Italy. Wang et al. (2020) and Wu, Leung, Bushman, Kishore, Niehus, de Salazar, Cowling,
Lipsitch and Leung (2020) estimate the evolution of the COVID-19 cases in Wuhan, while Atkeson (2020) in-
vestigates the impact of social distancing for the virus spread in the US, and Ferguson et al. (2020) analyze the
impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions to contain the virus expansion in the Great Britain.
2
where N is the total population on the arrival day of the first person infected by COVID-
19, xt is the accumulated number of people infected by COVID-19 on day t and zt is the
accumulated number of people never infected on day t.2 On day 1, x1 = 1 and z1 = N − 1.
For any future day t, the law of motion for xt is
xt = xt−1 + αy
x˜t−1
N − kt−1 zt−1 (1)
that adds up to its value on the previous day, xt−1, the number of newly infected people
αy x˜t−1N−kt−1 zt−1. In the latter term, 0 < α < 1 is the contagion probability on each encounter
between one non-infected person and one infected person, y > 0 is the number of people
each person meets per day, x˜t−1 is the number of people currently infected as of day t− 1,
and kt−1 is the accumulated number of deaths caused by COVID-19 as of day t− 1.3
The ratio x˜t−1N−kt−1 provides the share of currently infected people with respect to the sur-
viving population at the end of day t− 1, which determines the probability of meeting some-
one infected. Thus, the product of the number of encounters by the rate of infected people,
y x˜t−1N−kt−1 , is the number of infected people every person meets on day t. Once we multiply
it by the contagion probability on each encounter, we have αy x˜t−1N−kt−1 as the effective daily
contagion rate per person. The number of people who have never been infected at the end of
day t− 1 is zt−1, and they are the potential newly infected people (susceptible people in the
SIR methodology). Therefore, the second term on the right side of (1), αy x˜t−1N−kt−1 zt−1, is the
number of newly infected people on day t. It explains how the number of new cases depends
on both the contagion probability α, and on the total number of encounters between infected
and non-infected individuals, y x˜t−1N−kt−1 zt−1.
The difference between the accumulated number of people infected, xt, and the number of
people (still) currently infected, x˜t, comes from the fact that the COVID-19 disease is neither
chronic nor necessarily lethal. Let us assume, for simplicity, that the outcome of the disease
is realized within an interval of days after the incubation period (outcome interval). Thus, if
2We assume that the initial population N remains constant in this decomposition to consider that all deaths
caused by the virus infection will determine the lethality rate of the virus. The same result would be obtained if
there where no migration flows and the daily natality rate would be the same as the mortality rate not-related
to COVID-19. Given the short time horizon of the analysis and the focus of the paper, we have decided to fix N.
3For simplicity, the contagion probability α is both constant over time and identical for all meetings, which
ignores heterogeneity in the meeting duration, the degree of physical contact, the viral load of the transmitter,
etc. Hence, α is considered to represent contagion probability under average circumstances. We also assume
the number of daily social contacts, y, is constant and exogenous, which must be interpreted as the behavior of
the representative individual.
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the incubation period of the virus is Ti days, where i denotes ‘incubation’, the lower bound
of the outcome interval is the next day after the end of the incubation period, i.e. Ti + 1
days. The upper bound is set to have an outcome interval with the same number of days
above and below the average duration of the disease, T. Subsequently, the upper bound is
T + (T − (Ti + 1)) = 2T − (Ti + 1) days after the virus contagion.
The realization of the disease outcome is uniformly distributed along the days of the
outcome interval.4 Since the number of days with possible realizations of the disease is 2T−
(Ti + 1)− (Ti + 1)+ 1 = 2 (T − (Ti + 1))+ 1, there is a constant fraction for each daily cohort
of infected people, 12(T−(Ti+1))+1 , who perceives the outcome of the disease on a given day.
Therefore, the law of motion for the number of currently infected people by COVID-19 is
x˜t = x˜t−1 + αy
x˜t−1
N − kt−1 zt−1 −
(
1
2(T−(Ti+1))+1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=(Ti+1)
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
(2)
The individuals of each cohort can either recover (with an associated survival probability
0 < 1− λ < 1) or die (with an associated fatality probability 0 < λ < 1). The evolution of
accumulated deaths, kt, is as follows
kt = kt−1 + λ
(
1
2 (T − (Ti + 1)) + 1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=(Ti+1)
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
Naturally, the accumulated number of recovered people, ht, is
ht = ht−1 + (1− λ)
(
1
2 (T − (Ti + 1)) + 1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=Ti+1
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
Since N = xt + zt, we can split up the total infected people in three possible states, xt =
ht + kt + x˜t, to get
N = ht + kt + x˜t + zt (3)
which means that total population, N, comprise the people who have already healed, ht, the
people who have already died, kt, the people who are infected with their outcome not yet
known, x˜t, and the people who have never been infected, zt.
4This is assumed to avoid excessive complexity and due to the uncertainty on the real distribution. Fur-
thermore, there is a large case variability on COVID-19 infections due to person-specific characteristics, for
example, age, immune system capacity, early diagnosis and treatment, which makes plausible the assumption
of a uniform distribution of the outcome realizations along the days of the outcome interval.
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COVID-19 is an infectious virus that typically causes mild symptoms similar to the com-
mon flu, and only a minor fraction of sick people who test positive need hospitalization.5
Nevertheless, the contagion rate of COVID-19 is very high and the capacity of hospitals to
give treatment to sick people is severely constrained. In the model, we assume that a fraction
θ of the infected people who have passed the incubation period, Ti, suffer from severe com-
plications (typically, respiratory difficulties and pneumonia) and need hospitalization. Thus,
the number of hospital beds, bt, required to treat COVID-19 positive people on day t is
bt = θ
2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=Ti+1
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
where ∑
2T−(Ti+1)
j=Ti+1
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
is the total number of infected people who have passed the
incubation period, Ti, on day t.
To summarize, we have a dynamic system of 6 equations as follows:
xt = xt−1 + αy
x˜t−1
N − kt−1 zt−1
x˜t = x˜t−1 + αy
x˜t−1
N − kt−1 zt−1 −
(
1
2 (T − (Ti + 1)) + 1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=(Ti+1)
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
N = xt + zt
kt = kt−1 + λ
(
1
2 (T − (Ti + 1)) + 1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=(Ti+1)
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
ht = ht−1 + (1− λ)
(
1
2 (T − (Ti + 1)) + 1
) 2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=(Ti+1)
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
bt = θ
2T−(Ti+1)
∑
j=Ti+1
(
xt−j − xt−j−1
)
which determine the evolution of the 6 endogenous variables {xt, x˜t, zt, kt, ht, bt}, given
initial values.
5In fact, some of the people infected with COVID-19 are asymptomatic, which makes the spreading out of
the epidemic more difficult to prevent and control by the health authorities. Anderson et al. (2020) say that
“Estimates suggest that about 80% of people with COVID-19 have mild or asymptomatic disease...”.
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3 Model calibration for Spain
The baseline calibration is aimed at representing the outbreak of COVID-19 in a medium-size
country. We take the case of Spain because the virus spread has been distributed quite evenly
within the territory, with a similar evolution on the daily growth of confirmed cases and the
reproduction number observed across the Spanish administrative provinces (ISCIII (2020)).
As the variables of our model do not incorporate spatial differentiation, we find it suitable
for studying the impact of the virus in territories with homogeneous contagion patterns such
as Spain (and not other countries that have the pandemic concentrated close to its epicentre,
such as China, Italy or the US).
Table 1: Calibration of model parameters for Spain
Population N = 47× 106
Fatality rate λ = 0.0085
Disease average duration (days) T = 16
Incubation period (days) Ti = 5
Hospitalization rate θ = 0.0528
Daily encounters per person in normal times y = 25
Contagion probability α = 0.01615
The total population is N = 47 million people to coincide approximately with the popu-
lation of Spain in 2020. For the fatality rate, λ, we follow Anderson et al. (2020) who provide
an estimated range between 0.3% and 1% with reference on the data released by the World
Health Organization.6 Typically, the Infection Fatality Rate (IFR), defined as confirmed deathsconfirmed+unconfirmed cases ,
is lower than the Case Fatality Rate (CFR), measured as confirmed deathsconfirmed cases . Since some of the
COVID-19 cases are not reported because they are either asymptomatic or the tests have not
been taken these two indicators tend to be quite different, with a higher value of the CFR
over the IFR. Our model produces the IFR. Spain may experience a relatively high IFR due
to the population aging (in 2019 people over 75 years old represented 9.54% of the total pop-
ulation) and the much stronger severity of COVID-19 on the elderly.7 As for capacity, Spain
6Recently, Wu, Leung, Bushman, Kishore, Niehus, de Salazar, Cowling, Lipsitch and Leung (2020) have low-
ered the estimate of the case fatality risk (measured as the the probability of dying after developing symptoms)
of COVID-19 in Wuhan to 1.4%.
7For comparative purpose, the percentage of population over 75 years old in the UK was 8.29% in 2018.
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has approximately 300 hospital beds per 100,000 people (below the EU average of about 372
beds), and health coverage is guaranteed by the government with a well-developed public
provision of hospitals and treatments. Balancing out these arguments, we set λ = 0.0085
(0.85%), above the median value of the range suggested by Anderson et al. (2020).
The incubation period for COVID-19 is about 5 or 6 days and there is an average period
of 10 days or more (longer than a common flu) of confrontation between the immune system
and the virus (Anderson et al. (2020)). Therefore, we set an average disease duration at
T = 15 days and the incubation period last for 5 days, Ti = 5.8 Thus, the calibrated outcome
interval runs from (Ti + 1) = 6 days after the contagion to 2T − (Ti + 1) = 26 days after the
contagion.
Ferguson et al. (2020) estimate the COVID-19 hospitalization rate for the population of
the Great Britain using a subset of cases obtained from China. Their estimate is 4.4%. For
Spain, as we assume that in its population there is a higher fraction of elderly people than
in either Great Britain or China, we set the hospitalization rate at θ = 0.0528 (5.28%), which
implies a 20% higher value than the one reported in Ferguson et al. (2020).
The daily number of two-people encounters per day is subject to heterogeneity because
it clearly depends on the specific social and economic characteristics of the individuals (the
type of job, social/leisure activities, age, etc.), as well as on the social norms and habits of a
country or territory. People gatherings for social and economic activities are quite common in
Spain. Thus, we set y = 25 meetings to represent an average behavior of Spanish citizens in
normal times, though recognizing the uncertainty and variance that affect this model param-
eter.9 On March 14th, 2020, the Spanish government declared a state of emergency, the “State
of Alarm” (SoA) in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in Spain. The decree contemplated
mobility restrictions, school and socioeconomic activity suspensions, and home confinement
for the population. Fifteen days after the SoA declaration (March 29th, 2020), the govern-
ment passed further actions and enforced home confinement to every person whose job is
not related to either health care or basic needs. On April 13th, the government gave legal
permission to resume the production activity on the manufacturing and construction sectors
conditioned to the compliance with protective actions to prevent the virus contagion at the
workplace (wearing protection gear, keeping interpersonal distance, reorganizing shifts to
minimize workers concentration, etc.). The calibrated model can represent the SoA as a pol-
8Prem et al. (2020) assumed a similar incubation period (6.4 days) and a shorter average disease duration
(between 9.4 and 13.4 days) in their case study for Wuhan.
9Prem et al. (2020) assume much lower values of daily contacts for Wuhan.
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icy intervention that significantly reduces the number of physical contacts among citizens.
Hence, we will capture the effects of the SoA intervention by reducing, on the SoA declara-
tion day, the number of interpersonal daily encounters from y = 25 to y = 4. The tighter
lockdown actions, that came into force 15 days past the SoA declaration, are represented as
an additional 35% cut in the number of personal contacts to y = 2.6 encounters per day.10
Once the tightening is partially relaxed, 30 days past the SoA declaration, the number of
daily contacts returns to y = 4 and we also cut the contagion probability by 25% to capture
the preventive effect of the new working conditions.
The choice of the day in which the isolation is enforced can be crucial for the posterior
extension of the disease (as we will document below). Thus, we paid special attention to
selecting the day of our model series when the policy intervention took place in Spain. The
first confirmed infected person in Spain was a German tourist who tested positive of COVID-
19 in La Gomera (Canary Islands) on January 29, 2020. In turn, we consider January 29 as
day 1, and the SoA declaration day (March 14) is day 45. The tightening of the SoA, which
reduced work permissions only to jobs related to essential needs, took place on March 29,
which is identified as day 60 of the series. The conditioned return to some of the economic
activities (April 13) corresponds to day 75.
10The Spanish Minister of internal affairs commented on a press conference on the first day after the suspen-
sion of all non-basic economic activities that traffic in public transportation fell 34% compared to the previous
working day.
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Figure 1: Deaths caused by COVID-19 in Spain.
The contagion probability α measures the speed at which the virus spreads. In Spain, the
COVID-19 showed exponential growing patterns in the early stages with doubling times for
confirmed cases and deaths between 2 and 4 days and a reproduction number, R0, between
4.0 and 7.0 (ISCIII (2020)).11 As the true number of infected people cannot be observed in
the data, we have calibrated the value of α to match the series of deaths caused by COVID-
19 in Spain (which are comparable between the model simulations and the data).12 Official
11Ferguson et al. (2020) assume a doubling time of the confirmed cases of COVID-19 at 5 days. As for the
reporduction number, they say “Based on fits to the early growth-rate of the epidemic in Wuhan, we make a baseline
assumption that R0 = 2.4 but examine values between 2.4 and 2.6.”.
12Moreover, a direct observation of the contagion probability α is not possible because the incubation period
9
data frequently underestimate the number of COVID-19 deaths because many casualties take
place outside hospitals (home, elderly residences). Wu, McCann, Katz and Peltier (2020) find
these missing deaths to be a very large number for the outbreak in Spain by comparing the
excess over the historical average of mortality registration with the official number reported
by the government. Specifically, Wu, McCann, Katz and Peltier (2020) calculate that by April
5, 2020, the number of accumulated deaths caused by COVID-19 in Spain should be 19,700
instead of the officially reported value of 12,400 (7,300 missing deaths). We have chosen
the value of the primary contagion probability, α, to match the datapoint of 19,700 deaths on
April 5 in the series of accumulated deaths generated by the model. This criterion determined
setting α = 0.01615. Figure 1 shows the official data (up to the latest available observation
from May 2nd) and model simulations of accumulated and daily deaths caused by COVID-
19 in Spain.13 Both the phases and peak day of the curve of daily deaths is well replicated by
the model, with the gap due to the missing deaths reported by Wu, McCann, Katz and Peltier
(2020). Such difference tends to shrink over the downward phase, which is consistent with a
larger number of tests taken and the mitigation of the problems for the diagnosis provision
that have characterized the peak days of the COVID-19 epidemic in Spain.
4 Simulation results
We have programmed the simulations in Matlab.14 For initial values, we consider that on
day 1, t = 1, there is one imported contagion and one person gets infected while the rest
of the population had no virus, i.e. x1 = x˜1 = 1. Then, we run the calibrated six-equation
model forward over the next 365 days to analyze the effects of the SoA declaration for the
COVID-19 spread in Spain. In addition, we simulate the model under alternative decisions
on the timing and intensity of the policy intervention. The variables to be discussed here
are the number of infected people, accumulated deaths and the number of hospital beds
required to treat COVID-19 (infected people who need hospitalization). The benchmark case
is the “no intervention” scenario, keeping y = 25 as calibrated for normal times in Spain. If
of COVID19 is typically long (5 or 6 days) and many infected people are not tested. These difficulties justify the
criterion chosen to calibrate α based on the matching between ex post observations of model simulations and
the data.
13The model prediction for the COVID-19 death toll on April 25 is 33,048 deaths. The official number released
on that day was 22,902 which would raise the nuber of missing deaths from 7,300 on April 5 to 10,146 on April
25.
14The Matlab code written to carry out the model simulations is available upon request.
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there would have been no intervention, the model prediction is that almost all the Spanish
people would have been infected (46.95 million people) and, applying the fatality rate, 0.85%
of them (nearly 400 thousand people) would have died.
The estimated effects of the SoA intervention are displayed as red lines in Figure 2.15 In
comparison to the no intervention scenario (black lines), the curves of infected people and
hospitalized people shift down and widen up as a clear example of the ‘flattening of the
curve’ pattern. If we compare the values of the columns of “No intervention” and “Day 45
(SoA)” reported from Table 2, we find impressive effects. Thus, the SoA declaration is esti-
mated to reduce the accumulated number of infected people from 46.95 million to 5 million,
the maximum number of people who need hospitalization from nearly 2.4 million people to
155 thousand people (a 93.5% cut), and in accumulated deaths from almost 400 thousand to
42.5 thousand (a 89% cut).
4.1 The timing of social distancing
As shown in the bottom right-hand cell of Figure 2, the number of people who need to be
hospitalized show no apparent variation in the first days after the SoA declaration in compar-
ison to the no intervention case. The reason for this lack of effects is that the reduction in the
hospitalized people will not be realized before the end of the 5-day incubation period. Pre-
cisely, it is day 51 (6 days after the SoA day) when the slope of the red line flattens as there are
fewer infected people who develop symptoms and need to be hospitalized. We represent the
Spanish hospital bed capacity as the horizontal dash line in the diagram of the bottom right-
hand side of Figures 2 and 3.16 The model estimates that between days 50 and 78 (nearly one
month) the demand for hospital beds exceeds capacity.17 The downward phase is fast for
some days after the peak day but it turns slower on day 70 onwards (coinciding with the end
of the outcome interval assumed in the calibration).
15It should be noticed that the axes of Figures 2 and 3 have been truncated from above due to the huge value
of the variables in the no intervention case.
16Spain has an overall amount of around 141,000 hospital beds. Let us suppose that in normal times the
capacity utilization rate is 60%. Thus, the hospital beds capacity to cope with the COVID-19 spread in Spain is
assumed to be 60% of 141,000 which is 84,600 units.
17This result of the model can be corroborated by numerous examples of rush instalments of field hospitals
and temporary capacity extensions (hotels, extra space in hospital buildings) in Spain during the worst days of
the COVID-19 pandemic. The Spanish health authorities have announced that the largest field hospital put up
to treat COVID-19 patients (IFEMA fair and exhibitions facility in Madrid) will be closing on May 1st when it
started receiving COVID-19 patients on March 25th.
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Figure 2: Effects of alternative timings for the isolation policy in Spain following the
COVID-19 outbreak
Table 2: Simulation results of the timing of social distancing in Spain
No intervention Day 41 Day 45 (SoA) Day 49
• Accumulated infected people, millions 46.95 1.65 5.00 12.74
• Accumulated deaths, thousands 399.1 14.0 42.5 108.3
• Daily peak of hospitalized people, thousands 2383 44.3 155.1 468.7
Peak day 68 62 64 67
A 4-day earlier intervention (day 41) would have been prevented many infections and
reduced the number of deaths and the hospitalization needs (see the flattening and pushing
down of the green lines in Figure 2 relative to the red lines). Numbers reported in Table 2
support an important point on undertaking early action. In a scenario with social distancing
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enforced 4 days earlier, the model estimates a reduction by 67% in the accumulated num-
bers of infected people (from 5 million to 1.65 million) and deaths (28.5 thousand lives are
estimated that would have been saved). Moreover, the number of required hospitalizations
drops by 71% on peak day, from 155,100 to 44,300, which could have been totally covered by
the Spanish health care system (see Figure 2).
The 4-day postponement of the intervention to day 49 would have increased infected
people, hospitalization needs, and deaths by a factor close to 2.5 (see the blue lines in Figure
2 and the numbers reported in Table 2). The situation would have been catastrophic for the
health assistance of more than 330 thousand people who need medical treatment on the peak
day, when this number is more than 6 times the Spanish hospitalization capacity.
In short, the simulation results indicate that the choice of the day for setting the enforce-
ment of social distancing has critical consequences on the evolution of the virus spread.
4.2 The intensity of social distancing
The effects of different degrees of intensity of the social distancing action taken by the Spanish
government are documented in Figure 3 and Table 3. Thus, we compare the cases of y = 3
(more intensity on isolation) and y = 5 (less intensity on isolation) to the calibrated setting of
y = 4 for the SoA procurement. Once again, the quantitative effects are very large (although
somehow not as large as they were for the timing of the intervention).
Table 3: Simulation results of the intensity of social distancing in Spain
No intervention y = 3 y = 4 (SoA) y = 5
• Accumulated infected people, millions 46.95 3.30 5.00 8.57
• Accumulated deaths, thousands 399.1 28.0 42.5 72.9
• Daily peak of hospitalized people, thousands 2383 126.3 155.1 192.4
Peak day 68 63 64 66
Both the numbers reported in Table 3 and the green lines on Figure 3 indicate that only re-
ducing the SoA enforcement in one more interpersonal meeting would produce an estimated
decrease in the number of accumulated deaths by 34% (from 42.5 thousand to 28 thousand)
and in the peak number of people who need hospitalization by 19% (from 155 thousand to
126 thousand). By contrast, a looser implementation of the SoA with y = 5 daily encounters
per person would have an important cost in human lives (the accumulated number of deaths
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would rise by 30 thousand) and on the number of people who need hospitalization (on peak
day 37 thousand more). Actually, the health care system would be on the verge of collapsing
because for 45 consecutive days (between day 50 and day 94, both included) more hospital
beds would be required than the installed capacity.
Figure 3: Effects of alternative intensities for the isolation policy in Spain following the
COVID-19 outbreak
4.3 The effects of isolation enforcement on the epidemic duration
Next, we analyze the duration of the epidemic under alternative scenarios. Usually, social
distancing and isolation policies are considered to cause the flattening of the curve on the
epidemic characterized by both lower peak values (shift down and widening of the curve)
and a later observation of these peak values (shift to the right of the curve). The delay on the
observed peak is sometimes used by commentators and policy makers as a justification for
not implementing a severe isolation enforcement due to a longer epidemic duration. Figure
14
4 displays the plots of the model-generated daily series of currently infected people in Spain
under alternative scenarios of isolation: no intervention (y = 25), SoA (y = 4 from day 45),
earlier SoA (y = 4 from day 41), and tighter SoA (y = 3 from day 45). The full-sized vision
of Figure 4 clearly illustrates the dramatic effects of isolation to produce the flattening of the
curve. Figure 4 also shows that the isolation policies do not involve any shifting of the curve
to the right because the peak day is not delayed following any isolation intervention.
Table 4 reports earlier peak days of currently infected people upon any isolation enforce-
ment compared to no intervention (Tables 2 and 3 also documented earlier peak days on
hospitalization needs).
The duration of the epidemic is apparently similar in all cases displayed in Figure 4, as by
day 100 numbers converge towards the zero line on the number of currently infected people.
From the SoA declaration, day 45, to approximately day 85 the number of currently infected
people without intervention is dramatically higher than any case of isolation enforcement.
After day 85 or so, Figure 4 seems to indicate that the black line (no intervention) falls below
the other lines (isolation enforcement).
Although peak days are anticipated due to isolation, Table 4 reports that the downsizing
of the epidemic is faster under the no intervention than with any case of isolation enforce-
ment. If we look at the forecast estimates on day 105 (60 days after the SoA declaration), the
no intervention scenario would have 1,000 infected people (0.003% of the value on peak day)
while the number under the SoA enforcement would still be 254 thousand (13% of the value
on peak day). Either earlier or stricter isolation actions reduce the number of infected peo-
ple to 92 thousand and 65 thousand, respectively. If we look ahead at 90 days after the SoA
declaration, all scenarios would lead to small numbers of remaining infected people (virtu-
ally 0 for the no intervention case and between 9 thousand and 71 thousand with isolation
enforcement).18 These numbers call for a cautious design of the calendar for the isolation
downsizing that restores gradually the economic and social activities when the number of
active cases is sufficiently low.19
18Even though the experiment of a tighter isolation enforcement is estimated to save less lives than the ear-
lier enforcement case (compare the numbers provided, respectively, in Tables 2 and 3), the model simulations
indicate that a tighter enforcement would bring down the number of people infected faster than the earlier
enforcement.
19While our focus is on studying the effects of immediate mobility controls in dealing with the ongoing health
crisis, their unavoidable drastic effects on economic activity are underway. An early example is Eichenbaum
et al. (2020) who embed an epidemiological model in a macroeconomic general equilibrium model to study the
tradeoff between the severity of decline in output and lives saved.
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Figure 4: Estimated duration of COVID-19 epidemic in Spain on alternative isolation en-
forcement scenarios
Table 4: Simulation results of the duration of the COVID-19 epidemic in Spain
No intervention SoA Earlier SoA Tighter SoA
Peak day for currently infected people 60 58 55 49
Number of currently infected people, thousands
• on day 45 (SoA declaration) 2020 1538 482 1515
• on peak day 37029 1914 542 1620
• on day 75 (30 days after SoA declaration) 10273 928 279 481
• on day 105 (60 days after SoA declaration) 1 254 92 65
• on day 135 (90 days after SoA declaration) 0 71 32 9
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4.4 A second peak?
The State of Alarm in Spain contemplates a gradual return to normality from May 11 (day
102), when the general quarantine period will be over and many of the isolation enforce-
ment actions (home lockdowns and mobility restrictions) will cease. Family meetings will
be permitted with some limitations of the duration and the number of relatives involved.
In addition, most shops, bars, restaurants and hotels will be reopened subject to controls on
interpersonal distance and continuous disinfection. In turn, the number of daily encoun-
ters between Spanish citizens will rise. For the virus spread containment, health authorities
are announcing that some activities will still remain suspended (schools, music concerts,
people-attending sports competitions,...), preventive actions will be required for both work-
ing and using public transportation (wearing masks and gloves, regular disinfections and
hand washing, keeping a safe interpersonal distance), and a wide public provision of tests
for a rapid identification and self-isolation of positive cases will be available. These miti-
gation actions will likely cut the contagion probability.20 The after-lockdown stage of the
epidemic would be therefore characterized by a higher value in the number of daily meet-
ings per person, y, and a lower value in the primary contagion probability, α. These two
changes have opposing effects on the contagion pace, that have not be considered so far
and will be discussed next. Since αy is the product of the primary contagion probability,
α, times the number of daily encounters, y, we can refer to it as the maximum contagion
probability (i.e., the one associated to the case of meeting infected people in all the daily
encounters). The calibrated value of αy for the SoA stage prior to the end of lockdown is
αy = (0.75)(0.01615)(25− 21) = (0.0121)(4) = 0.0484 (4.84%). Taking αy = 4.84% as the
benchmark value, we will examine the evolution of the COVID-19 curve under 3 possible
scenarios for αy after May 11:
- A high value of maximum contagion probability: αy = (0.01)(10) = 0.10 (or 10%)
- A moderate value of maximum contagion probability: αy = (0.01)(8) = 0.08 (or 8%)
- A low value of maximum contagion probability: αy = (0.01)(6) = 0.06 (or 6%)
These scenarios combine a lower primary contagion probability (α falls from 0.0121 to
0.01) with a higher number of daily encounters per person (y rises from 4 to 10, 8, or 6).
Figure 5 and Table 5 show the results.
Small changes in the value of the maximum contagion probability αy result in quite dif-
20Additionally, as the Summer season approaches the average temperature in Spain turns substantially
warmer which may reduce the transmission power of COVID-19. This effect would imply a lower contagion
probability, α.
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ferent trajectories for the COVID-19 spread in Spain. When αy rises from 4.84% to 10%, the
curve of currently infected people quickly bends uphill with a 100-day long period of a con-
tinuous increasing (see the blue line in Figure 5). Hence, the resulting second wave would be
even worse than the one suffered in March: it would last longer and the peak number of cur-
rently infected people would be observed with 2.85 million. The effects in the accumulated
number of infected people and deaths would be dramatic (see Table 5).
A more moderate increase in the maximum contagion probability from 4.84% to 8% would
still produce a second peak of the virus spread but with a smaller prevalence than the first
peak. As the red line of Figure 5 shows, the number of infected people would feature a low
positive slope from May to September. On the second peak day (around mid-September),
the number of currently infected people is 462 thousand, approximately 1/4 of the value ob-
served in late March. The death toll and the accumulated number of infections would be
more than doubling the numbers obtained with no mitigation of social distancing (reported
in Table 2) because the COVID-19 epidemic would be present in Spain for the whole year.
Figure 5: COVID-19 contagion spread in Spain after social distancing mitigation
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Table 5: Simulation results of the COVID-19 spread in Spain after social distance mitiga-
tion
αy = 0.10 αy = 0.08 αy = 0.06
• Accumulated infected people, millions 25.12 11.24 5.35
• Accumulated deaths, thousands 213.2 93.6 45.5
• Second peak of currently infected people, (Yes/No) Yes Yes No
Infected people on second peak day, thousands 2851 462 -
Second peak day 207 226 -
If the increase of the maximum contagion probability after May 11 were small (from 4.84%
to 6%), there would be no second wave of the COVID-19 outbreak and the curve would keep
moving downhill (see green line of Figure 5). The accumulated numbers of infected people
and death would barely increase. This result shows that a second wave can be avoided if the
change in the maximum contagion probability, αy, is sufficiently low. We have searched for
the threshold of αy that determines whether the curve turns upward or continues downward.
Such critical level is found at αy = 0.0761 (7.61%) that delivers a flat line of active cases
after the vertical dotted May 11 line in Figure 5. Thus, the Spanish health authorities should
monitor that the maximum contagion probability stays below 7.61% to prevent a second
COVID-19 peak.
5 Conclusions
We presented a dynamic discrete-time model of the COVID-19 spread that provides infor-
mation on six variables relevant for the quantitative analysis of many ongoing containment
efforts.
The model has been calibrated to Spanish data to quantify the impact of alternative iso-
lation enforcements in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to the no interven-
tion scenario, the State of Alarm declaration is estimated to cut the number of accumulated
deaths by 89% and the number of hospital beds needed by 93.5%. Both an earlier and a more
intense intervention could have been crucial for further reductions in infected people, deaths
and hospitalizations. The isolation enforcement does not delay the peak day of the epidemic
but slows down its end.
The model estimates that the day of the State of Alarm declaration (March 14) Spain had
19
1.5 million actively infected people, on peak day (March 27) it reached 1.9 million and on the
last day of forced home confinement (May 10) it will have dropped to 300 thousand. The
mitigation of isolation enforcement could bring a second wave of the COVID-19 outbreak in
Spain if the maximum contagion probability rises from 4.84% to beyond 7.61%.
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